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PARENTAL AUTIIORITY: THE COMMUNITY AND THE LAw. By Julius Cohen,
Reginald A. H. Robson, and Alan Bates. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers
University Press. 1958. Pp. xii, 301. $6.

A law professor and two sociologists report herein on a joint attempt
to assess the degree of congruence between existing legal doctrine, in a
defined area of application, and a factor which the authors call "the
moral sense of the community." The justification for the study is pr<r
vided by the law member of the team, and proceeds from the observation
that legal scholars, groping for standards of criticism external to the
law, seem to gravitate toward a "sense of justice," or of "injustice"toward a view of morality, at least, which is shared, to some degree, by
the people in the community wherein the law is applicable. The authors
vigorously and repeatedly disclaim a position on whether or to what
extent such a common moral sense should by the law be taken into
account. They assert, however, that law-makers, both legislative and
judicial, do in fact frequently refer to it, and the argument is that if
the moral sense of the community is relevant at all, then it makes sense
to consider how that datum may be ascertained more scientifically than
by the divination or intuition of the individual judge or legislator. Their
study is offered as an example of how this may be done by making use
of the developed techniques of public opinion research. They do not
suggest, of course, the canvassing of the community's moral sense in order
to establish premises for the adjudication of individual cases. It is argued,
rather, that within a given area of law it would be possible to establish
community reactions to a selected battery of propositions, and that these
reactions could then be used as analogical bases for prediction of community reaction to other situations in a way which, to lawyers, would be
quite familiar. Their project is an experimental survey of this type in the
general area of parent-child relations.
The community selected was the adult population of the state of
Nebraska. The information was obtained by personal interview, based on
a standardized questionnaire, of a scientifically selected sample of that
population. The basis of the study was 860 interviews, one for every 1,000
of population. The method of selecting the sample, preparing the questionnaire, training the interviewers, etc., is described in some detail
for the benefit of anyone interested in pursuing a similar investigation.
The questionnaire, and extensive tables of statistics compiled from the
answers recorded, are set forth in full in appendices. The body of the
book is a very readable account of the results, and of the conclusions
drawn from them.
The questions asked of the respondents sought to determine their
opinions as to what solutions the law ought to achieve in certain described
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problem situations. An example will serve to convey an idea of their
nature. "What if an 18 or 19 year old child wants very much to go to
college~ but the parents are completely set against it, even though the
child has been awarded a scholarship to pay all his college expenses? In
this case, if the law allowed the parents to keep the child out of college,
it could mean that the child would lose out on the benefits which
a college education can bring. On the other hand, if the law prevented
the parents from keeping the child out of college, it would reduce
parental control and increase the amount of outside authority over the
family to that extent. With this in mind, should the law allow these
parents to keep the child out of college, or should the law prevent them
from doing this?" After securing an answer to the principal question the
interviewer probed for reactions to the same problem under varying
circumstances, e.g., in this instance, assuming that the parents were
poor, that the child was a boy, or a girl, etc. He then summarized the
answers, allowed the respondent to react to the summary, and asked
him to state his reasons for his position. The responses were tabulated
to show the extent to which there is agreement in the community as to
what the law should do, and the extent to which the community views
correspond with the solutions which would probably be reached under
actual litigational circumstances. Correlations between positions assumed
by the respondents and their social and personal background characteristics, such as sex, age, urban versus rural environment, religious affiliation,
etc., were analyzed, and the reasons cited by the respondents were generalized to the extent possible.
It is, perhaps, umesponsive to argue the merits of the questions which
were propounded to the public, for, as I have said, the authors carefully
disclaim any position on the extent to which the law should seek to
effectuate the community moral sense which they were investigating. They
set out to establish a method, not a matrix for the remaking of the law
in the area of family relations. They were, nevertheless, unable completely
to conceal their feeling that their study could be used by "law-makers
whose juristic philosophy stakes out as an objective a high degree of
harmony between the existing law and the moral sense of the community"
as a ready-made set of specifications for law revision in the area of family
law. Furthermore, as it seems to me, their failure to consider the basic
question-what bearing should community moral attitudes have with
reference to the specific problems propounded-has led them into a
fallacy which is fundamental, and which would be very difficult to avoid
in any similar project.
The subject of investigation was the parent-child relation in its aspect
of parental control versus child autonomy, with some attention given also
to opinion regarding the proper locus of responsibility, whether with
family or government, for the support of indigent persons. Their statistics
reveal that on a total of 17 issues investigated there was a fair degree of
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correspondence between the law and community views on five, disagreement on ten, and that the results in two instances were ambiguous. This
amount of disagreement they regard as a serious finding. They suggest
that it may be explained by the fact that law-makers are likely to be more
impressed by tradition than is the general public, that this is an area
in which there is likely to be little practical pressure for change, and that
law-makers have simply failed to utilize adequate techniques to inform
themselves of community views. In other words, the variance is explained
as a lag between the law and a progressive public opinion. The findings
"point up two crucial problems of political science: the distance between law-makers and their subjects, and the phenomenon of public
acquiescence.... [T]he study raises anew the issue of adequacy of existing
machinery for transmitting community feelings, sentiments and felt convictions to law-makers." (p. 21) These are rather portentous conclusions,
and it seems appropriate to examine the information upon which they
are based.
To support the proposition that there is a grave variance between
the law and the moral sense of the community the authors cite the
responses received on ten issues. Two of these relate to the minimum
legal age for marriage, and parental authority to prevent a child's marriage
by refusing consent. On neither of these issues did the disagreement found
relate to the principle involved. It related, instead, only to the ages at
which marriage should be legally possible, and consent unnecessary. The
views of the community were diverse, and tended, contrary to the trend
found on other issues, to be more conservative (i.e., in favor of more
extensive parental control) than the law. A third related to whether a
natural parent, having voluntarily surrendered custody of his child to
another, should be permitted to recover it. On this issue 30 percent of
the respondents sided with the natural parent, 60 percent with the person
having custody, and 10 percent were in the "don't know" column. The
authors assumed the law would be on the side of the natural parent. With
such uncertainty among the voters, however, one can hardly say on this
basis that there is a shocking discrepancy between community views and
the law. A fourth issue related to legal liabilities for damage done by a
minor child, and the finding of disagreement between the law and public
opinion seems to result, very largely, from what I believe to be a misinterpretation of the law. The question put to the respondents was
whether the child or the parent should be legally liable for damage
caused by the child in four different situations, unintentionally caused
property damage and bodily injury, and intentionally caused property
damage and bodily injury. Nebraska has a statute, enacted in 19!H, imposing upon parents joint and several liability for willful and intentional
destruction of property occasioned by their minor, unemancipated children. The respondents favored the view that for intentionally caused harm
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the child should be liable, and this was taken to be inconsistent with the
law. The statute, however, does not in terms abolish the child's indisputable common law liability, and it would be surprising if it were construed to have that effect. The law, therefore, recognizes liability on the
part of both parent and child, an alternative which was not put to the
respondents. In the unintentional injury situations the respondents were
about evenly divided on the allocation of liability when the child was
assumed to be 19 or 20 years of age, and favored parental responsibility
when the child was younger. Again this was put to them as an either/or
proposition, and it is probable that the answer was influenced more by
concern for the injured party than ·by concern for the child. Actually
the law has managed, in response to this same concern, to recognize
responsibility on the part of the parent, in addition to the normal liability
of the child, for unintentional injury caused by the child in some
situations, e.g., use of the family car. [Wieck v. Blessin, 165 Neb. 282,
85 N.vy. (2d) 628 (1957).] This development would tend to minimize
any lack of correspondence between law and community views under
this heading. With reference to these four issues, therefore, I cannot feel
that any very serious disagreement between the law and clear community
attitudes has been established.
On all the remaining six issues where disagreement between law
and morals was found, the law, at the present time, occupies a position
of laissez faire. The questions relate to parental "authority" (1) to
determine whether a child may have a college education, (2) to determine
the child's religious affiliation, (3) to prevent the child from entering a
career of his own choosing, (4) to transfer custody of a child to another
person without legal supervision, (5) to disinherit the child, and (6)
to treat the child's earnings as the parent's own property. In all six
cases it is assumed that the law bestows upon the parent the "authority"
indicated, and in all six cases the community view, according to the survey,
was that the law should "prevent" the parents from exercising such
authority. It is on these six issues that an unequivocal discrepancy is found
between the law and the moral standards of the community, and it must
be principally in connection with these issues that we judge the authors'
assertions that there is a serious lag between law and public opinion, a
lag which they suggest is to be attributed to imperfections in the political
process, and to the "dissenting acquiescence" of a population too inert
to resist.
Considering these six issues, it will be noted that the parental "authority" referred to in the first three instances is nothing more than
the de facto compulsion which the parent, by the very existence of the
family relation, is enabled to exert. The extent of its legal recognition is
that the state has not established procedures for supervising it, and the
probability is that if an issue between parent and child were in some
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manner raised in court, the court would refuse to interfere unless the
acts by which the compulsion was exerted were criminal, or so abusive
as to place in legal jeopardy the parent's custody of the child. In assessing the reasons mentioned by the respondents for their indicated views,
the authors thought that there was a noteworthy absence of feeling that
the law should not intrude itself into the parent-child relationship. The
percentage of those who took the "allow" position and who adverted
to this point was relatively small, throughout. The authors' interpretation
of this fact is exemplified by the following comment: "Although where
the choice of a child's religious affiliation is concerned, there is greater
expressed sentiment in ·the community against the role of government
than when the issue relates to the availability of a college education, the
predominant sentiment, nevertheless, would still recognize the need
to respect the child's independent choice of religious affiliation, and, if
required, to employ legal sanctions against the parent to effectuate it."
(p. 171) A bit farther on the authors indicate that "Those who favored some
legal control of parental authority . . . were not asked just what specific
type of legal controls should be imposed: this would have been far too
involved and complicated for our undertaking. It is fairly safe to assume
that they favored some government-sanctioned means-the exercise of
authority outside the realm of parental control for the achievement of
the given ends." (p. 186. Emphasis added, in part.)
I agree that it would probably have been both impracticable and
useless to have raised the "how" question with the average member of
the public. But is it not of the essence? I submit that these answers
cannot be taken to be, in any practical sense, a true representation of
community desires, for it is apparent that the respondents had not the
slightest awareness of the practical implications of their answers. Some
of the questions incorporated a caveat, "if the law prevented the parents
from keeping the child out of college, it would reduce parental control and
increase the amount of outside authority over the family to that extent."
But how much meaning does this carry to one who is not familiar with
the workings of the political-legal machinery of the state? If the questions had been formulated not in the denatured "should the law allow
or prevent?" form, but in the terms in which they would be faced by
the legislator or the judge-"Should a statute be enacted establishing
a Family Liberties Commission with power to conduct investigations into
invasions by parents of certain enumerated liberties of their children, to
issue subpoenas and compel testimony, and to issue cease and desist
orders against parents found to have committed such invasions, and to
maintain actions in court to compel obedience to such orders, etc."-or"Should a child who feels himself aggrieved by the act of his parent refusing to him his right of free religious association be permitted to maintain in the courts an action for injunctive relief, etc."-is it likely that the
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citizenry would have exhibited the same enthusiasm for the Big Brother
approach that this survey seems to have revealed?
The other three of the six instances of disagreement between law
and morals are somewhat different, involving situations (transfer of custody,
disinheritance, parental ownership of child's earnings) which can, by a
lawyer, be more easily conceived of as subjects of legal regulation. As the
descent of property is already regulated by law, there would be no great
derangement if the applicable law excluded complete disinheritance of a
child. It might be doubted that the respondents have envisioned all the
implications, but at least the probabilities are greater here that an implementation of their views would not produce practical consequences which
would shock the majority of people affected. Administrative difficulties are
certainly very substantial with reference to the custody and ownership
of earnings issues, however. It is easy to pass a law-"Any person who,
without prior approval of the probate court, gives his child into the custody of another person (permanently? for a period in excess of - - days? with the intent to abandon custody himself?) shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Enforcement would be another matter, family connections
being as casual as, regrettably, they sometimes are. And with reference
to the child's earnings, how should the law attend to their protection?
It would be possible, I suppose, to require all parents to account as
fiduciaries, periodically or upon the attainment by their children of
majority, but I would imagine that compliance would be secured only
to the accompaniment of a considerable amount of kicking and screaming.
The subject is fascinating, and the literary qualities of the book are
high. It will reward any reader, whether he is jurisprudentially oriented
or simply an interested observer of the society in which he lives. As
a novel experiment the study adds to the sum total of our experience
whether the individual reader's conclusions with respect to the relevance
and validity of the experimenters' methods are positive or negative. To
me it furnishes strong evidence of the necessity for continuing close
attention to the factors which make it practicable and desirable to seek
some social objectives through legal standards and sanctions, while making
it equally apparent that other objectives must be left to other forms of
social control. I have no doubt that the moral views indicated by the
survey are effective in assuring that few parents actually exercise the full
extent of the "authority" over their children which the law would probably
tolerate. I am equally certain that to attempt to bring the law into alignment with these views would be rank folly. Law does not consist solely of
norms of conduc_t. The official sanction through which the norm is enforced is an inescapable concomitant. A personal conviction as to what,
in the abstract, ought to be, may serve very well as a moral standard,
operating through the conscience and will of the individual, but it cannot
be assumed that the sa;me conviction would survive a marriage to official
compulsion.
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Many of the norms which were approved by the respondents in the
Nebraska survey are such that they could be brought to bear upon the
community only through legal sanctions which, according to this reader's
intuition, would be found, by the same persons who approved the norms,
to be quite intolerable, and by the agents of the law to be incapable of
administration. I would submit, therefore, that an inquiry into popular
views of "what the law should be" can be most misleading if it does not
raise, with the persons interviewed, the legislative question in all its complexity. If that question were raised, I would doubt the ability of the
great majority of all citizens to respond to it in an informed and intelligent
way. Query, then, whether the law-maker can expect as much help from
the opinion surveyer as these authors suggest.

Luke K. Cooperrider,
Professor of Law,
University of Michigan

